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JUSTICE RESTRAINED OR UNRESTRAINED
JUSTICES:
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE-
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT OR
THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS-
WHOSE IS MORE REASONABLE?
"Just as every cop is a criminal..
I. Introduction
Lately, all the public seems to be exposed to are reports about
police corruption and misconduct.2 However, what has not been
discussed is just what role the New York Court of Appeals has played
in developing this sentiment. Often the Court of Appeals construes
the New York Constitution more restrictively than how the United
States Supreme Court interprets the virtually identical federal
provision, the Fourth Amendment, and thus, police in New York are
forced into untenable dilemmas which result from this conflict of
interpretation.
It is recognized that in each individual state "[t]he powers
reserved to the several States will extend to all objects which in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties
of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of
I THE ROLLING STONES, Sympathyfor the Devil, on BEGGARS BANQUET (London Records
1968).
2See generally Thin Blue Lies, Cops Shouldn't Commit Perjury, NEWSDAY (New York)
Feb. 6, 1995, at A20; Selwyn Raab, Corruption in Uniform: The Case: A Bodega, A
Bagman, and a Sting, N. Y. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 1994, at 24 (reporting corruption scandals of
the New York City Police Department).
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the State."3 With regard to a state's highest court's interpretation of
the state constitution, as long as the state constitution (and its judicial
holdings) is not more expansive than what the United States Supreme
Court dictates (and the U.S. Constitution allows),4 "[i]t is peculiarly
within the competence of the highest court of a State to determine that
in its jurisdiction the police should be subject to more stringent rules
than are required as a federal constitutional minimum."5 While many
states have given discretion to their highest court to interpret their
state constitution, other states have enacted statutory limits on the
discretion a state's highest court may exercise in interpreting certain
provisions of the state constitution.6
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
4 Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (noting that "a state may not impose such
greater restrictionsas a matter of federal constitutional law when [the U.S. Supreme Court]
specifically refrains from imposing them" but may restrict police powers further than federal
standards require).
5 Id. at 728 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
6 For example, the search and seizure provision of the Florida State Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonablesearches and seizures.... shall not be
violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon
probable cause.... This right shall be construed in
conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court. Articles or
information obtained in violation of this right shall
not be admissible in evidence if such articles or
information would be inadmissible under decisions
of the United States Supreme Court construing the
Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. (Emphasis added).
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Over the past several decades, the New York Court of Appeals
has consistently chosen to interpret Article I, section 12 of the New
York Constitution in a more restrictive manner than the United States
Supreme Court interprets the Fourth Amendment.' This narrower
interpretation has placed a great burden upon the law enforcement
officers of New York-especially in their ability to perform legally
admissible warrantless searches and seizures-as are allowed by the
United States Supreme Court.9
The thrust of this Note is that the more constrained
interpretation of Article I, section 12 of the New York Constitution is
unreasonable for policing the streets of New York today. The New
York Constitution should be amended to protect the public from the
potential abuse of police power, while at the same time enable the
police to more effectively perform their lawful duties.
The narrowing of the search and seizure doctrine which the
New York Court of Appeals has now undertaken places upon police
officers the obligation of enforcing a restrictive, fluid, confusing,
complicated and duplicative set of rules."° It is this effusive
combination that severely impacts the ability of law enforcement
The New York provision equivalent to the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution is Article I, section 12 of the New York Constitution. It states that "the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall be issued except upon
probable cause .. " N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
' Compare Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (holding the "plain [touch]
feel" exception permissible) with People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298 (N.Y. 1993) (holding the
"plain touch" exception impermissible).
'See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15, 30 (1968) (ruling that police may reasonably seize
a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons without probable cause to arrest
that person, and that any weapons taken in such a search may'be introduced as evidence).
0 See, e.g., Diaz, 612 N.E.2d at 298 (characterizing a less restrictive "plain view"
doctrine as a "bootstrapping" justification for warrantless searches, and disallowing fruits
of plain touch searches to be introduced into evidence).
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officers in securing convictions, having evidence admitted and giving
testimony in court."
Part II of this Note will provide an overview of the warrantless
search and seizure policy as permitted by the Fourth Amendment and
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. The development of
the more limited warrantless search and seizure policy as defined by
the New York Court of Appeals will also be reviewed. In Part 11 the
illustrative case of a warrantless search and seizure, Terry v. Ohio, 2
will be closely detailed to illustrate the federal boundaries of the
warrantless search and seizure exceptions as permitted under the
Fourth Amendment.
Part III will examine the practical impact of the confined
interpretation by the New York Court of Appeals and how this
restrained interpretation affects police officers, and ultimately citizens
of New York. Part III will also examine the ramifications of the
Court of Appeals interpretation of a "plain touch" search in People v.
Diaz.3 In Diaz, the Court refused to allow into evidence felony
weight narcotics, which were the fruits of a "plain touch" search, even
after the Court determined that the initial stop, questioning and frisk
of the defendant for a weapon was within the boundaries of the law.'4
"Since February 16, 1971, the New York City Police Department'sOffice of the Deputy
Commissioner for Legal Matters has published 193 Legal Bureau Bulletins [hereinafter
BULLETINS] dealing with topics such as search and seizure, probable cause for arrest,
Miranda, etc. Of these 193 BULLETINS, 79 or forty-one percent (41%) have been revoked
or changed in some substantive manner based on state or federal court decisions or statutory
construction. It is through these Bulletins that the New York City Police Department
communicates pertinent legal topics and changes to its thirty thousand member force.
(Documents on file with author).
2 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
'3 Diaz, 612 N.E.2d at 301.
"Id. at 300. In Diaz, the Court found the stop and frisk of Mr. Diaz to be valid, but
when an object felt was immediatelydetermined by the officer not to be a firearm, but rather
a bag of crack vials, the officer was found to be in violation of Diaz's right to be free from
an unauthorized seizure, and thus the officer could not seize the contraband and arrest Diaz
414 [Vol. XIII
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However, this ruling is adverse to the U.S. Supreme Court decision
in Minnesota v. Dickerson,5 which found the "plain touch" exception
to be a legitimate warrantless search and seizure exception under the
Fourth Amendment. 16
Part IV will assert the concept that more search and seizure
arrests should be prosecuted under the federal standard either by
circumventingthe handcuffs of the New York Court of Appeals, or by
the New York State Legislature amending Article I, section 12 of the
New York Constitution. In this section, the issue of police officers'
credibility in courtroom testimony will also be explored. The Mollen
Commission Report [hereinafter Commission Report]7 stated that
police officers of New York City frequently committed "civil rights
violations" 8 when they performed warrantless search and seizures and
that afterwards, when they testified in court, they often testified
falsely. 9 This "practice of police falsification in such arrests is so
common in certain precincts that it has spawned its own word:
'testilying."'20
The Conclusion will examine how police officers would be
more adequately prepared to perform their duties without committing
"civil rights violations, '21 and how the public would be better served
and protected if the police were to have their search and seizure
for criminal possession of a controlled substance. Id.
15 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
16 Id.
'" COMMISSION REPORT: COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE
CORRUPTIONAND THE ANTI-CORRUPTIONPROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT (July
7, 1994) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. The Mollen Commission, chaired by the
Honorable Milton Mollen, examined, inter alia, the credibility of police officers' courtroom
testimony and the investigation and arrest of former Police Officer Michael Dowd. Id.
1 Id. at 122, 156.
'9 Id. at 36.
20 /d.
21 Id. at 122, 156.
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arrests prosecuted under the "less stringent [federal] evidentiary
rules"22 instead of under the holdings of the more restrictive Court of
Appeals.
II. An Overview of Warrantless Searches & Seizures
Uniformity in the interpretation of our laws between the state
and federal courts is a goal long supported by the judiciary.23 Courts
have felt that uniformity would best serve our society and further the
continuity and the expectations of our laws.24 It is recognized that
each sovereign state has the right to enforce and interpret its statutes
as it deems fit, as long as the individual state remains in conformity
with the Constitutionof the United States.2  Thus, each state has the
right to interpret its own state constitution in any manner, as long as
this interpretation is not in conflict with the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Federal Constitution. 6
However, the right of an individual state to interpret its own
state constitution sometimes causes a conflict between state and
federal constitutional issues. Indeed, the Supreme Court specifically
stated in Dickersod7 that the reason "[w]e granted certiorari. . [was]
to resolve a conflict among the state and federal'courts over whether
22 Mary Jo White, Keeping Cops On the Up and Up, NEWSDAY, Oct. 19, 1994, at A32.
23 See, e.g., People v. Bora, 634 N.E.2d 168, 170 (N.Y. 1994) (stating that while the
wording of the New York State Constitution's search and seizure provision "supports a
policy of uniformity between State and Federal courts," New York courts have held that the
state provision "for reasons peculiar to New York, is subject to its own interpretation..
24 /d.
25 Hass, 420 U.S. at 719.
26 Id.
27 Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366.
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contraband detected through the sense of touch during a pat-down
search may be admitted into evidence."28
It was the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio29 in which the
Supreme Court allowed admission of evidence derived from a
warrantless search.3 ° Terry dealt with a protective pat-down search of
a robbery suspect by an on-duty police officer.3 The officer, fearing
that the suspect was armed, conducted a frisk and discovered a
firearm.3" The Terry Court said "[t]he question is whether in all
circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, [the defendant's] right
to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and
seizure."" The Court concluded that "a rigid and unthinking
application of the Exclusionary Rule, in futile protest against practices
which it can never be used effectively to control, may exact a high toll
in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime."34 The
Exclusionary Rule states that where evidence is the fruit of an
unreasonable search and seizure, the evidence will be inadmissible at
trial.35 "Terry began in earnest the balancing of law enforcement and
privacy interests now common throughout Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. "36
28 Id. at 371. However, the Court in Dickerson held that although the plain touch doctrine
is a valid exception under the Fourth Amendment, the officers in that case went beyond the
scope of plain touch by their manipulation and touching of the object felt in the suspects
pocket. Id. at 378-79.
29 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
30 Id. at 30.
" Id. at 7.
32 Id. at 6-7.
" Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
34 Id. at 15.
"5 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (I949), which held that evidence obtained by an unconstitutionalsearch and seizure was
only inadmissible in a federal court).
36 David A. Harris, Factors For Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 661 (1994).
4171997]
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The warrantless search and seizure rules, as laid down by the
Terry decision, provide that if an officer has a reasonable suspicion"
when the officer encounters a subject who might be armed and
dangerous, and the officer lacks probable cause to make an arrest, the
officer may still legally conduct a stop and frisk of the individual to
determine if the subject is armed." The Terry Court recognized that
policing is a dangerous undertaking39 and thus wanted to provide the
police with an appropriate discretionary tool that would enable law
enforcement officers to safely serve their communities.40
In addition to the Terry Court's recognition of the "long
tradition of armed violence"'41 in the United States, other federal
courts have gone even further in discussing the proliferation of
firearms on the streets of America.41 In United States v. Oates, 43 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, quoting from
an earlier Second Circuit case, United States v. Weiner,44 stated that
"[w]e have recognized that to substantial dealers in narcotics, firearms
are as much tools of the drug dealers' trade as are most common
recognized articles of drug paraphernalia ....
Immediately after taking office on January 1, 1994, New York
City Mayor Rudolph Guiliani, and now former-New York City Police
" Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (noting that a mere inarticulate "hunch" is insufficient for an
officer to conduct a warrantless search and seizure).
" Id. at 24, 27.
39 Id. at 23 (stating that many law enforcement officers are killed or wounded in the line
of duty each year).
40 Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (stating that a "police officer may in appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly
criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest").
41 Id. at 23.
42 See, e.g., U.S. v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 62 (2d Cir. 1977).
43 Id.
44 534 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1976).
4 1 Id. at 18.
418 [Vol. XlII
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Commissioner William Bratton, announced in quick succession their
policing strategies.46 It was of no surprise that the very first policing
strategy announced was Police Strategy No. 1: Getting Guns off the
Streets of New York.47  This was followed weeks later by Police
Strategy No. 3: Driving Drug Dealers Out of New York 48 These
strategies, combined with the Terry decision and its progeny, the
recent Dickerson decision and the observations of the Second Circuit,
all indicate that there is genuine concern about the proliferation of
firearms and illegal drugs and the dangers they pose to the citizens
and the law enforcement officers of this country.49
The United States Supreme Court has set the parameters for
the protections afforded to the people during an on-the-street
encounter with an officer." The New York Court of Appeals has
chosen to take those minimum parameters and limit them even
further, thereby providing even greater protections for the citizens of
New York during on-the-street warrantless search and seizure
encounters with a police officer." These greater protections come
about by their strict interpretation of the warrantless search and
seizure provisions of Article I, section 12 of the New York
Constitution. 2
46 See generally William J. Bratton, The New York City Police Department's Civil
Enforcement of Quality of Life Crimes, 3 J. L. & POL'Y 447,451(1995) (explaining Mayor
Giuliani'sand the New York City Police Department's "criminal justice policies" and their
"strategic approach to both crime and disorder"); see also Clifford Krauss, Guiliani Sets
New Policy to Spur Drug Arrests by Officers on Beats, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 1994, at I
(announcing Giuliani's "new strategy on drug trafficking").
47 POLICE STRATEGYNO. 1: Getting Guns off the Streets of New York, Mar. 7, 1994 (on
file with author).
48 POLICE STRATEGYNO 3: DrivingDrug Dealers Out ofNew York; Apr. 6, 1994 (on file
with author).
41 See supra notes 27-28, 47-48, and accompanying text.
'o Terry, 392 U.S. at 1.
"' People v. DeBour, 352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976).
52 Id.
1919971
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III. The Impact of the New York Decisions
In People v. DeBour53 the Court of Appeals outlined a "four-
tiered test to determine the propriety of encounters initiated by police
officers in their criminal law enforcement capacity. '5 4 The four tiers
were concisely defined by then Chief Judge Sol Wachtler in People
v. Hollman." The former Chief Judge's opinion, citing to DeBour,
defined these tiers as: 1) if a police officer wishes to request
information from any citizen, that request must be "supported by an
objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality;' 6
and 2) if the officer has a "founded suspicion that criminality is
afoot"" the officer may exercise the common-law right of inquiry
which permits "a somewhat greater intrusion."58 The final two tiers
are similar to the situations that the U.S. Supreme Court permitted in
Terry: 3) if the situation is one where the officer has reasonable
suspicion that a "particular person was involved in a misdemeanor or
felony, the officer is authorized to forcibly stop and detain that
person;"59 and 4) "where the officer has probable cause to arrest, an
arrest is authorized.' ° The Hollman Court went out of its way to give
deference to the DeBour decision by stating that "[w]e are convinced
that the four-part DeBour analysis still has vitality."'" It is this last
generation analysis that a law enforcement officer must digest,
53 Id.
54 Id. at 571.
15 People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d. 204 (N.Y. 1992). The questioning of a passenger on
a bus at the Port Authority Bus Terminal, and the subsequent warrantless search of his bag,
was done solely because the passenger fit the profile of a drug courier. Id.
16 Id. at 205.
57 Id.
5I ld.
39 Id.
60 Hollman, 590 N.E.2d at 206.
6 1J d.
420 [Vol. XIII
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evaluate, comprehend and apply to every on-street situation with a
citizen before the officer may even initiate an "encounter."62
Outside the purview of this Note are the myriad (and
constantly changing) U.S. Supreme Court and New York Court of
Appeals decisions that effect the conduct of an officer when the
officer encounters an individual and an automobile (the so-called
automobile exception)63 or the "lungeable, grabbable" exception
cases.
64
62 Id.
63 E.g., People v. Belton, 432 N.E.2d 745 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that the search of a
closed container within the passenger compartment of the defendant's vehicle is within the
scope of Fourth Amendment exception to the warrantless search and seizure). Accord
People v. Galak, 616 N.E.2d 842 (N.Y. 1993) (permitting an officer, after the suspect has
been removed from his vehicle, to conduct a "warrantless search of a vehicle if the officer
has probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence or contraband and there is
a nexus between the probable cause to search and the crime for which the arrest is being
made"). See BULLETINS, Vol. 24, No. 4 (July 1994); see also People v. Jackson, 590
N.E.2d 240 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that an officer may conduct a warrantless search of a
closed container in a suspect's vehicle based upon reasonable suspicion that the container
contains a weapon and if the defendant is inside the vehicle or the container is within close
proximity of the defendant).
4 Chimel v. California, 935 U.S. 752 (1969).
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the
arresting officer to search the person arrested in
order to remove any weapons that the latter might
seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well
be, endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee to prevent its concealment or destruction.
And the area into which an arrestee might reach in
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must,
of course, be governed by the like rule. (Emphasis
added).
Id. at 763. See also Peoplev. Jackson, 590 N.E.2d 240 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that a police
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
In a state where the violent crime rate is one of the highest in
the nation,65 in a city where an average of 2,049 citizens were
murdered each year over the past five years,66 in a city where one of
the major newspapers keeps a daily box score and a running tally of
deaths committed with a firearm,67 the Court of Appeals has placed
unrealistic restrictions on how law enforcement officers must conduct
an on-the-street encounter. In Albany, the city where the Court of
Appeals is located, the leading newspaper does not run a daily death
count by firearm.6" To police the streets of East New York, the South
Bronx, Washington Heights, or the many other dangerous parts of
New York, the citizens and the police should be afforded the more
realistic United States Supreme Court protections as defined by Terry.
A crystallization of this point was made in People v.
Hampton, 69 when the Court of Appeals refused to hear the States'
appeal and let the reversal of a bargained guilty plea and twenty-year
sentence remain, thereby subjecting the citizens of New York to the
release of an admitted killer.7" The intermediate Appellate Court in
Hampton found that the officers displayed excessive force and lacked
the appropriate level of proof required by the four tiers of DeBour
officer wasjustified in reaching into car to shine flashlight into bag that was within suspect's
reach to ensure that the bag did not contain a dangerous instrument because the suspect was
still sitting in the car next to the bag at the time of the search); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S.
325 (1990) (holding that a protective sweep of a residence was allowed when the officers
conducted the sweep to see if there were other persons present that might pose an immediate
threat to the officers).
65 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report Statistics For the Twenty-Five
Largest Cities in the United States For 1993 (on file with author).
66 John Marzulli, Crime In the City, DAILY NEWS (New York), Oct. 18, 1994, at A36.
In 1996, the murder count was 98 1. Murders Down Nationally, NEWSDAY, Jan. 1, 1997,
at A48.
6 7 See generally NEWSDAY.
6
1 See generally ALBANY TIMES-UNION.
69 200 A.D.2d 466 (N.Y. 1994).
70 ld.
422 [Vol. XIII
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when the officers unholstered and drew their firearms after the
occupant of a livery cab alighted from the cab and began walking
towards the officers with an Uzi submachine gun.7'
The United States Supreme Court held in United States v.
Sharp72 that "a court making [the] assessment [of reasonableness]
should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly
developing situation, and in such cases should not indulge in
unrealistic second guessing. ''73  It is unrealistic for the police to
approach an erratically driven vehicle with anything less then full
vigilance and preparedness?4 Given the circumstances surrounding the
suspicious vehicle stop, the location of the stop and the late hour, it
' Id. The New York Court of Appeals left in place a reversal by the Appellate Division,
First Department, a plea bargained conviction of the defendant for attempted murder in the
second degree, first degree robbery, criminal possession of a weapon and criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. Id. Hampton's conviction was
overturned because the Appellate Division found that the police officers lacked reasonable
suspicion, when, late at night, in the South Bronx, the officers pulled over an erratically
driven gypsy cab with three male occupants in the rear. Id. at 469. Before the uniformed
officers exited their unmarked vehicle and began their approach to the livery cab, the
defendant alighted from the rear of the cab and approachedthe officers carrying a thin white
plastic bag through which the officer could determine, by the shape and outline, was an Uzi
submachinegun. Id. at 467. The officers then exited their vehicle with firearms drawn, and
ordered Hampton to stop. Id. The officers arrested the defendant but were unable to pursue
the other two occupants of the livery cab who fled while the arrest of the machine gun toting
defendant was taking place. Id. In addition to the machine gun, the officers recovered two
other firearms from the rear of the cab and other evidence which enabled the detectives to
solve two homicides. Id. The defendant pled guilty to the above listed charges and was
sentenced to twenty years. Id. at 466. Hampton's case went to the Appellate Division, First
Department, and was reversed because the Court found that the stop of the livery cab did
not meet the DeBourtests Id. at 468. In dissent, Judge Ross stated "[i]f the officers were
entitled to approach the cab based upon their suspicion the cab driver might be the victim
of a robbery or worse, it is naive and dangerous to expect them to approach the vehicle with
holstered weapons." Id. at 470.
72470 U.S. 680 (1993).
" Id. at 686.
71 Hampton, 200 A.D.2d at 470 (Ross, J., dissenting).
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would be completely reasonable to approach a situation like the one in
Hampton in a heightened state of alert.
In the words of Judge Simons, writing for a unanimous Court of
Appeals in People v. Bora,75 "for reasons peculiar to New York, it is
subject to its own interpretation."76 The "it" to which Judge Simons
referred is the wording of Article I, section 12 of the New York
Constitution." Strangely, it is also in this "peculiar" case where the
Court of Appeals reaffirmed its desire to support uniformity between
state and federal courts.78 The Bora Court went on to say that "[t]here
are no bright lines separating various types of police activity.
Determining whether a seizure occurs during the course of a street
encounter between the police and a private citizen involves an analysis
of the most subtle aspects of our constitutional guarantees."79 This
indicates that the Court is quite willing to review search and seizure
cases very closely and in its own "peculiar" way.8
One of the starkest dichotomies between the New York and
federal interpretations of search and seizure jurisprudence involves the
admissibilityof evidence seized under the concept known as the "plain
touch" exception.8 In People v. Diaz, E decided on April 8, 1993; the
" 634 N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 1994).
76Id. at 170; see also People v. Keta, 539 N.E.2d 1238 (N.Y. 1982); People v. Johnson,
488 N.E.2d 439 (N.Y. 1985).
77 Id.
While the search and seizure provision of the State
Constitution is similar to the wording of the Fourth
Amendment and supports a policy of uniformity
between State and Federal courts, we have held
that our State provision, for reasons peculiar to
New York, is subject to its own interpretation.
(Emphasis added). Id.
78 Id.
791d. at 170 (quoting People v. Cantor, 324 N.E.2d 872, 877 (N.Y. 1975)).
80Bora, 634 N.E.2d at 170.
s! Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 366.
82 612 N.E.2d 298 (N.Y. 1993).
'424 [Vol. XIII
19971 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 425
Court of Appeals refused to recognize the "plain touch" doctrine based
on their analysis of Article I, section 12 of the New York Constitution
and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.83 The language
used by the Court of Appeals is clear in this regard:
[t]here can be no question that the
reaching into defendant's pocket and
seizing the drugs were not within the
scope of the Terry pat-down. Under
both the State and Federal Constitutions,
the protective pat-down exception to the
warrant requirement authorizes a limited
search of lawfully detained suspects to
determine whether a weapon is present.
(Emphasis added).84
Thus on April 8, 1993, the Court of Appeals determined that
there was "no question" that the "plain touch" was not allowed under the
Fourth Amendment. 5 Howeverjust two months later, on June 7, 1993,
the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Minnesota v. Dickerson86 that the
"plain touch" concept was an exception to the warrantless search and
seizure doctrine and thus constitutionally permissible.87
I d. at 299. "[W]e reject the People's proposed extension of the plain view exception
and conclude thatjustifying the warrantless search on the basis of the items felt during the
protective pat-down would be contradictory to both [the] State and Federal Constitution."
Id.
84 Id. at 300.
" Id. at 299.
86 508 U.S. 366 (1993). The Court granted certiorari "to resolve a conflict among the
state and federal courts over whether contraband detected through the sense of touch during
a pat-down search may be admitted into evidence." Id. at 370.
87 Id. at 374. "If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels
an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been
no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search
for weapons." Id.
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There is no question that the New York and federal guidelines
regarding the "plain touch" doctrine are now at complete odds.8" On the
federal level, Dickerson allows evidence seized under the "plain touch"
doctrine to be admitted, whereas in New York, based on Diaz, evidence
is inadmissible under the "plain touch" doctrine. 9 This clear conflict
could be a factor in a situation where a New York City police officer,
who has taken the oath of office, ° encounters a situation covered under
the "plain touch" doctrine. If the officer wants to make a lawful "plain
touch" arrest, the officer must seek a federal prosecution. However, in
doing so, the officer must necessarily violate his/her own oath, because
the officer has sworn to uphold the "Constitution of the State of New
York,"" and the decisions of the Court of Appeals maintain that an
arrest under the "plain touch" doctrine is unconstitutional and thus
forbidden.92
The Court of Appeals has, with clarity, outlined what an officer
is not allowed to do in a situation where the officer has performed a
legal stop and pat-down and discovered contraband?3 But the Court has
98 Compare People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298 (N.Y. 1993), with Minnesota v. Dickerson,
508 U.S. 366 (1993).
9 Diaz, 612 N.E.2d at 298.
90 Oath of the New York City Police Department:
I do hereby pledge-and declare that I will uphold
the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of New York and that I
will faithfully discharge the duties of my new
position in the New York City Police Department
to the best of my ability. (Document on file with
author).
91 Id.
92 Diaz, 612 N.E.2d at 299.
9' Id. at 300. "The narrow scope of the intrusion authorized during a protective pat-down
may not exceed what is necessary to ascertaining [sic] the presence of weapons." Id. "Once
an officer has concluded that no weapon is present, the search is over and there is no
authority for further intrusion." Id.
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failed to address what the officer is supposed to do with the felon and the
contraband. Does the Court of Appeals expect the officer to let the
criminal go free? If so, what impact does this have on the officer's
credibility to any bystanders (and the felon himself)? The message sent
to the public, and the criminal element, is that the police are at best
simply lazy and unwilling to make an arrest, or at worst, corrupt and
willing to let criminals go free.
The Court of Appeals held in Diaz that the officer performed a
permissible pat-down,94 but after the officer determined that the object
he originally believed to be a weapon was in fact a number of crack
vials, the officer lacked the right to seize the contraband and arrest the
suspect.95 The Court held that the seizure was not an allowable
exception under the warrantless search and seizure doctrine.96 Is the
Court saying they want the officer to hold the individual until a search
warrant can be obtained? If so, on what grounds can the officer hold a
person, against his will, for any number of hours until a search warrant
can be obtained? Or did the Court expect the officer to release Diaz and
make an appointment with Diaz to return to the local station house in a
few hours to submit to a search, thereby giving the officer time to go to
the courthouse and secure a search warrant? Putting aside the ludicrous
nature of this last question, what judge is going to authorize a search
warrant in a situation where the felon is released from custody with the
contraband and who has a date for later in the day to come to the police
station and submit to a search and is then subject to arrest if found to be
in possession of contraband.
Simply put, the Court of Appeals has chosen to disallow the
"plain touch" doctrine but has not provided any reasonable outlet for the
94 Diaz, 612 N.E.2d at 300. "Therefore, in this case, because Officer Healy knew that
defendant's pocket did not contain a weapon, he was not authorized to search the pocket or
seize its contents absent [the] application of some other exception to the warrant
requirement." Id.
95 Id.
9 Id.
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officer who has performed a legally authorized pat-down and discovers
contraband other than a weapon.97 The Court failed to provide for the
instances when an officer performs a legally admissible stop and frisk,
but the pat-down discovers only readily identifiable contraband and not
a weapon.98
Another significant area of nonconformity between state and
federal court holdings is in the "good faith" doctrine.99 While the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized the concept of "good faith" during a
search and seizure situation,"°° the Court of Appeals has rejected this
theory.' This is yet another instance where the Court of Appeals has
chosen to interpret Article 1, section 12 of the New York Constitution 2
in a more confining manner then what is allowed under the Fourth
Amendment by the U.S. Supreme Court."°3
It would be speculative to opine if the New York Court of
Appeals will reverse themselves if they revisit the "plain touch" doctrine
in light of the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Dickerson. But, given the
Court of Appeals record of taking the more restrictive view, it is likely
that the Diaz holding will remain the law in New York.
97 d. at 3 10.
9" Cf Brett Andrew Harvey, Minnesota v. Dickerson and the Plain Touch Doctrine:
A Proposalto Preserve Fourth Amendment Liberties During Investigatory Stops, 58 ALB.
L. REv. 871 (1995).
9' The "good faith exception" to the Exclusionary Rule provides that "evidence is not
to be suppressed under such rules where the evidence was discovered by officers acting in
good faith and in reasonable, though mistaken, belief that they were authorized to take those
actions." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (6th ed. 1990). See also generally U.S. v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
'00 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900 (1984) (holding that if an officer reasonably
believed a search warrant to have been lawfully obtained, evidence obtained as a result of
this search warrant would be admissible under a new doctrine known as the "good faith"
exception to the Exclusionary Rule).
'0' People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417 (N.Y. 1985) (rejecting the "good faith" doctrine
based on the Court's interpretation of the New York Constitution).
102 N.Y. CONST. art I, § 12.
"03 Leon, 468 U.S. at 897.
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IV. Prosecuting Search & Seizure Cases
Under the Federal Standard
With this array of confusing and conflicting obligations facing
law enforcement officers of this state, it is no wonder that officers are at
times bewildered as to how to proceed.1°4 In an area of law enforcement
as critical as the warrantless search and seizure doctrine, police officers
should be expected to work under only one set of clearly defined rules.'05
In this limited but vital sphere, the binding rules on all police officers
should be "in conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court,"'06 i.e., the federal standard as defined in Terry. °7 This would
"Cf Police AddLaw Degrees to Their Badges and Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1994,
at A 15 (stating that officers with legal training know better how to proceed in a search and
seizure situation).
'o
5 See generally Elise Bjorkan Clare, Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 84 GEO. L.J.
743 (1996).
106 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12 Searches and Seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. . . . No
warrant shall be issued except upon probable
cause. . . . This right shall be construed in
conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court. Articles or
information obtained in violation of this right shall
not be admissible in evidence if such articles or
informationwould be inadmissibleunder decisions
of the United States Supreme Court construing the
Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. (Emphasis added).
107 Terry, 392 U.S. I (holding that a police officer who observed suspects exhibiting
behavior consistent with those who were contemplating committing a crime, acted
reasonably in stopping the suspects and patting their outer clothing to ascertain the presence
of weapons on their persons).
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afford the citizens of New York the protection of being "secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures." ' 8 The Terry standard would also provide the state law
enforcement community in New York a reasonable warrantless search
and seizure provision. If an officer is "able to point to specific and
articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from
those facts reasonably warrant that intrusion," then a warrantless search
and seizure arrest would be valid." 9 In Terry, Chief Justice Warren
wrote that:
a rigid and unthinking application of the
Exclusionary Rule, in futile protest
against practices which it can never be
used effectively to control, may exact a
high toll on human injury and
frustration of efforts to prevent crime.
No judicial opinion can comprehend the
protean variety of the street encounter..
110
Recently, Mary Jo White, the United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, stated that "[f]ederal law has distinct
advantages-less stringent evidentiary rules, immunity provisions that
make it easier to conduct grand jury investigations, and stiffer
penalties-that make such a partnership [with local law enforcement
agencies] desirable.""' Ms. White was referring to the close working
relationship between the U.S. Attorney's Office and local law
enforcement agencies in their efforts to combat corruption, but her
"' U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
109 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
" Id. at 14.
. White, supra note 22.
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statement reinforces the premise that federal "evidentiary rule[s]"
standards are the most powerful tool to ensure criminal convictions." 2
The New York City Police Department has recently undergone
a period of intense external and internal investigations regarding
corruption, its effects, and its impact on the function of the
Department." 3 On July 7, 1994, the Mollen Commission released its
final report,"4 which, in several places, examined police reports."5 The
Commission Report found that falsifying police reports "is probably the
most common form of police corruption facing the criminal justice
system .... .""6 The Commission Report further stated that "[o]fficers
... commit falsification to serve what they perceive to be 'legitimate'
law enforcement ends.""' 7 The Commission Report also found that
because of evidentiary rules, even officers who never resort to force or
theft will close the gap between the requirements of the law and the
demands of reality by falsifying the basis for their arrests or searches to
ensure a conviction under what they see as the unrealistic rules of the
courtroom. "'
The Commission Report correctly discussed the "devastating
consequences of police falsifications"" 9 and suggested that when a
person is "unlawfully arrested and convicted.., inadmissible evidence
is admitted at trial and ultimatelythe public trust in even the most honest
112 Id.
'3 See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Police Investigating Corruption Charges at a Bronx
Precinct, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at 1. Michael Dowd was a former New York City
Police Officer working in East New York, and later the Greenpoint sections of Brooklyn.
Id. Mr. Dowd, who pled guilty to state charges involving drug trafficking, testified at the
Mollen Commission hearing about his first hand knowledge of the extent of corruption in
the New York City Police Department. Id.
" COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17.
" Id. at 36.
116 Id.
"7 Id. at 38.
118 COMMISSION REPORT,. supra note 17.
... Id. at 41.
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officer is eroded. This erosion of trust causes the public to disbelieve
police testimony which results in the guilty being set free after trial."
20
Dealing with the "evidentiary rules," and attemptingto "close the
gaps" 12 'and other realities, has left law enforcement officers to deal with
the "peculiar" holdings of the Court of Appeals. 22  The state law
enforcement officer must overcome significant evidentiary hurdles to
make a valid warrantless search and seizure arrest in New York. 23 Ms.
White has counseled that the police use every tool available to combat
crime and this Note supports that suggestion. Local law enforcement
officers would savor the ability to make arrests using the "less stringent
evidentiary rules" available to federal law enforcement officers.
124
As noted above, the Commission Report suggested that police
officer falsification is the "most common form of police corruption
facing the criminal justice system."' 25 It is feasible that if the police
officers of New York operated under the "less stringent evidentiary
rules"'126 of the U.S. Supreme Court, they would not feel obligated to
121 Id. at 43.
121 Id.
122 See generally Bora, 634 N.E.2d at 168.
123 See, e.g., Diaz, 612 N.E.2d at 298. The Court dismissed an indictment for drug
charges that stemmed from narcotics found during a warrantlessweapons-protection search
by police. Id. The Court held that the owner of an item concealed by clothing has an
expectation of privacy and is not subject to a "plain touch" exception to warrantless
searches, in which a police officer might find contraband while patting a person down to
determine if he or she has a weapon. Id.
124 White, supra note 22 (noting that local and federal law enforcement should work
together in a partnership because, for example, federal law has "less stringent evidentiary
rules, immunity provisions that make it easier to conduct grand jury investigations and
stiffer penalties").
'25 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 36.
126 White, supra note 22.
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"falsify their arrest-reports and, if necessary, their testimony to insure
that the charges stick ....
The Commission Report recommended "legislative reforms" for
improving the operation of the New York City Police Department.'28
However, the Commission Report only made recommendations in the
areas of "discipline and sanctions." The Commission Report made no
reference to any constitutional "legislative reform."'29
One possibility is that Article I, section 12 of the New York
Constitution' 3 be amended to include an additional clause. This clause
could be identical to the one already in the Florida State Constitution 3'
which reads:
This right [to protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures]
shall be construed in conformity with
the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court.
Articles or information obtained in
127 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 38 (explaining that the Commission found
police falsification of reports is often an attempt to "insure that the circumstances of an
arrest comply" with the U.S. Constitution and police department regulations).
"28 Id. at 7. These reforms included establishing a "permanent independent oversight
body" to watch over the police departmentand fight corruption, as well as "internal reforms
and a new approach to combatting corruption." Id.
..9 The Commission Report explained "legislative reform" in the section dealing with the
sanctionsavailable when discipline of an officer is considered. Id. at 142-43. Also, in an
interim report dated December 22, 1993, the sentence "legislative reform, including the
issue of residency requirements" was referred to but no further attention was given to this
subject. Interim Report at 17 (on file with author).
130N.Y. CONST., art. 1, § 12 (providing security against unreasonable searches, seizures
and interceptions). The Article states "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonablesearches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ... " Id
"'1 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (quoting the search and seizure provision).
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violation of this right shall not be
admissible in evidence if such articles or
information would be inadmissible
under decisions of the United States
Supreme Court construing the Fourth
Amendment to the United States
Constitution. (Emphasis added).'
Under this amendment, all law enforcement officers (municipal,
state or federal) would be operating under a single system of "less
stringent evidentiary rules."'33 As a result, New York residents would
enjoy the mandated equal protections of the Federal Constitution against
unreasonable searches and seizures, as determined by the U.S. Supreme
Court.'34 The Court of Appeals would no longer be able to subject the
police officers of this state to the balancing of two sets of conflicting
rules. Police officers would not be compelled to violate their oath of
office in order to make certain types of arrests.'35 Consequently, law
enforcement officers would be better able to serve their communities
through a singular application of the rules of warrantless search and
seizure. Presently, officers must know and understand the federal
1
32 Id.
133 White, supra note 22.
31 See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 1. The Court noted that the Fourth Amendment protects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, providing individuals with a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Id. However, the Court held that if a police officer observes
behavior that makes him believe criminal activity might be underfoot and the person is
armed, the officer can, for his and the public's safety, search the outer clothing of the person
for weapons. Id. at 3 1. "Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment,
and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from
whom they were taken." Id. at 31.
"'3 Compare Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 266, in which the Court held the "plain touch"
exception applies, ruling that police may seize drugs and other contraband found during a
warrantless protective weapons pat-down search, with Diaz, 612 N.E.2d at 298, in which
the Court held drugs found in a "plain touch" search are inadmissible in court.
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thresholds for warrantless searches and seizures, 136 however, they must
weigh and apply those thresholds according to the holdings of the New
York Court of Appeals.'37
V. Conclusion
The proposition of calling for the use of a federal standard over
evidentiary rules is not novel.13 ' At this time there are a number of
community organizations and activist groups which support the
investigation and prosecution by the federal government of purely local
crimes.1 However, Mary Jo White has written that "[o]nly in rare cases
... should the 'Feds' operate independentlyof the Police Department."'40
What is proposed herein would foster the proposition made by Ms.
White that federal officials "should work primarily in partnership with
local law enforcement."' 4' For this partnership to work best, all law
enforcement officers should be allowed to use this more realistic single
system of less stringent evidentiary rules as applied to the federal
system.'42
136 Terry, 392 U.S. at I.
3 Compare Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 266 (1993), with People v. Diaz, 612
N.E.2d 298 (N.Y. 1993).
138See Greg B. Smith, Adult Trial Urged in Lemrick Case, DAILY NEWS, Aug. 8, 1994,
at A2.
'
39 See, e.g,, Patricia Hurtado, Crown Heights Trial Set in Federal Court; New Test for
Lemrick Nelson, Cleared in '92, NEWSDAY, Jan. 15, 1997, at A6 (noting how the acquittal
in 1992 of Lemrick Nelson, a black teen accused of killing a Jewish rabbinical student
during the Crown Heights riots in 1992, "triggered outraged protests from the Hasidic and
mainstream Jewish communities, a heated citywide debate.. ." and ultimately led to federal
civil rights charges being filed against Nelson). Nelson was eventually convicted of federal
civil rights violations in the riots and is currently awaiting sentencing. See, e.g., Joseph
Fried, A New Verdict in Crown Heights, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1997, at 2.
40 White, supra note 22.
141 Id
142 Id.
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Whether the criminal target is a gun-toting felon, a corrupt
public official, an outlaw police officer, or a drug dealing offender, the
law enforcement community should move against these elements with
the most reasonable of all possible tools. In cases of police corruption,
the climate is such that we must send a message to the public and let
them know that if a police officer violates the law they will be
prosecuted to the fullest extent, using less stringent evidentiary rules as
advocated by Ms. White." 3
The Mayor and former Police Commissioner of New York City
made firearms and drugs the focal points for the enforcement efforts of
the New York City Police Department.'44 By applying the decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court, the law enforcement officers of New York
would be better equipped to police the diverse, and often extremely
dangerous streets that exist in many locales around this state.
Furthermore, if police officers operated under the warrantless
search and seizure rules as allowed by the U.S. Supreme Court, there
may be fewer allegations of"civil rights" violations.'45 Many of these
allegations arise not because the officer is committing a "civil rights"
violation, as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court, but rather because of
alleged violations of Article I, section 12 of the New York Constitution.
If the proposed amendment to the state constitution were to be
ratified, the public would be guaranteed the right "to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures"'46 and society would be better served by its police officers.
The officer's credibility would not be diminished in a manner that
significantly hampers their capabilities in fighting crime and securing
I' ld. White speaks of using the "less stringent evidentiary rules" which is, in effect,
using the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the U.S. Constitution under the
Fourth Amendment. Id.
... POLICE STRATEGY No. I AND POLICE STRATEGY No. 3, supra notes 47-48.
141 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17 at 122, 156.
146 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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convictions of the guilty, 7 by "testilying" under a "peculiar" set of
holdings lacking "good faith."
... all saints are sinners."'48
James J. Bradley49
147 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 36 (noting that when police lose credibility
"they significantly hamper their own ability to fight crime and help convict the guilty").
48 THE ROLLING STONES, supra note 1.
"4 The author is a eighteen-year veteran with the New York City Police Department
presently holding the rank of Lieutenant. During his career, Mr. Bradley has worked in a
number of units including plain clothes assignments in street crime and the organized crime
units. Most recently, he has acted as the Director and founder of a multi-agency
(municipal, state and federal) training center. Mr. Bradley has been awarded over thirty-six
medals and commendationsfor valor and is a member of the Department's Honor Legion.

